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Abstract: John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice is examined from the perspective of
experimental methods in economics and complex adaptive systems simulations.
This paper first discusses the justice principle selection process in Rawls’s
representation of it as a hypothetical experiment. This hypothetical experiment fails
to satisfy reasonable experimental controls, particularly as reflects the conception of
the individual it employs. The second section of the paper discusses the differences
between Rawls’s two conceptions of rational persons associated with his distinction
between thin and full theories of the good. The third section uses his fuller
conception of rational persons, life plans, and psychological laws in the third part
of the book to offer an alternative view of the selection process understood as a
complex adaptive system. The fourth section turns to a topic raised by this complex
system approach, the status of normative reasoning in political-economic systems.
The fifth section summarizes.
Keywords: complex adaptive systems, economic models, hypothetical experiments,
normative reasoning, Rawls
JEL Classification Codes: D63, C9, B40, A12, A13

John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice ([1971] 1999) is remarkably influential for a book that
has arguably failed in a number of major respects.1 Though powerful in its vision of a
just society, and though receiving an incredible volume of commentary, Rawls’s
defense of its two principles of justice has hardly carried the day among philosophers,
economists, and political scientists. Among other things, this implies that its method
of argument, framed in terms of a hypothetical thought experiment designed to
explain the principles of justice selection process, must ultimately be regarded as
unsuccessful. Most of Rawls’s critics, however, have rather focused on the substantive
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normative principles in Rawls’s thinking.2 Few have examined his hypothetical
experiment according to the standards of experimental science to determine whether
it was likely to produce its expected outcome.3 My focus is the latter, and in this paper
I try to raise new issues about what we can learn from Rawls by asking questions that
arise specifically for economists, particularly in light of relatively recent developments
and new approaches in economics. The developments I am concerned with involve
empirical methods of investigation associated with the laboratory and complex
systems simulations. Viewing Rawls from these vantage points, I argue, casts a
different light on his logic of moving from individuals in what he calls the original
position to social outcomes, and also raises questions for economists regarding the
status of the normative in economics.
The first section of the paper critically examines Rawls’s main argument for his
two principles of justice in terms of his representation of the selection process in the
original position as a hypothetical experiment. The second section looks beyond the
usual focus on Rawls’s original position argument, and discusses the differences
between his conception of rational persons in the first and third parts of the book
associated with his distinction between thin and full theories of the good. The third
section uses his fuller conception of rational persons in the third part of the book to
offer an alternative view of the selection process as a complex adaptive system. The
fourth section turns to a topic raised by this alternative view, namely, the status of
normative reasoning in economics. The fifth section gives brief summary remarks.
The Original Position as if in the Laboratory
Rawls’s famous two principles of justice are principles he argues individuals would
choose for a society they would live in were they unable to determine what positions
they would occupy in that society. The means he uses to explain this selection is a
social contract idea he calls the original position that places individuals behind a veil
of ignorance regarding most features about themselves that would be relevant to what
places they might occupy in a society governed by any principles of justice. In the
main argument of A Theory of Justice where this selection process is described (Chapter
III, “The Original Position”), we are to imagine such individuals are presented with a
“short list of traditional conceptions of justice” (including his own two principles),
that they are “required to agree unanimously that one conception is best among those
enumerated,” and that their “decision is arrived at by making a series of comparisons
in pairs” (Rawls [1971] 1999, 122-123). Five alternative conceptions of justice are
listed with his own two principles placed at the top of the list (124). Rawls then
imposes a number of conditions on the hypothetical selection process, including that
the concepts of justice and right have been properly clarified for the individuals we
are to imagine being involved (Rawls [1971] 1999, §§22 and §§23), that these
individuals are properly behind the veil of ignorance in the sense that they must make
their choices without regard to their future possible places (§24), and that the
selectors behave as rational persons (§25). This set-up is summarized in twelve points
that characterize the set-up for the selection process. Rawls then guides us through the
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imaginary selection process itself by explaining how he believes individuals in the
original position would reason their way through the alternative principles of justice
(§§26-30). The result of this process is that his two principles are chosen by the
imaginary selectors as principles of justice over the principle of average utility and
classical utilitarianism as the main alternatives. Since the experiment is imaginary,
Rawls himself acts as a surrogate for an imaginary selector by carrying out the
reasoning process which he believes a representative individual would follow.
Rawls’s original position idea is fully within the tradition of social contract
thinking, but also involves a substantial innovation on that tradition in that it
replaces the state of nature idea most social contract theorists have employed with the
description of an imagined experiment framed in terms of scientific controls and
proper experimental procedures. Individuals once behind the veil of ignorance, that
is, are now seen as experimental subjects much as real experimental subjects in actual
experiments who have had the rules of experiments explained to them. Further, Rawls
judges the output of his imagined experiment in inductive terms as an experimentalist
would, asserting that “no attempt is made to deal with the general problem of the best
solution,” and that he is accordingly limited by his framework to demonstrating the
“weaker contention that the two principles would be chosen from the conceptions of
justice on the . . . list” (Rawls [1971] 1999, 123; emphasis added). In effect, he
implies, it is not his own deductive argument for the two principles of justice that
carries the day but rather that of his imagined decision-makers in the controlled
laboratory setting of the selection process.
The decision of the persons in the original position hinges . . . on a
balance of considerations. In this sense, there is an appeal to intuition at
the basis of the theory of justice. Yet when everything is tallied up, it may
be perfectly clear where the balance of reason lies. The relevant reasons
may have been so factored and analyzed by the description of the original
position that one conception of justice is distinctly preferable to the others.
The argument for it is not strictly speaking a proof, not yet anyway; but, in
[J.S.] Mill’s phrase, it may present considerations of determining the
intellect. (Rawls [1971] 1999, 124-125)
The two principles of justice, that is, are not determined by abstract reasoning, as was
typically the case with Rawls’s predecessors in the social contract tradition, but
according to the intuitions of Rawls’s imagined experimental subjects through their
tallying up process guided ultimately by what they find preferable. This result may be
recorded at most as telling us where “the balance of reason lies,” so that following
Mill, we learn what “considerations” may determine the intellect regarding justice. In
all this, Rawls presents himself as standing outside of and supervising a selection
process carried out by others, the results of which he of course favors, yet which his
construction of the original position tells us is not produced by him but rather by his
imagined experimental selectors.
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This of course is a highly indirect way to establish a set of conclusions, and thus
it is natural to ask why Rawls did not proceed in a more direct fashion by simply
arguing for his two principles of justice using standard philosophical methods. He
replies:
Now admittedly this is an unsatisfactory way to proceed. It would be better
if we could define necessary and sufficient conditions for a uniquely best
conception of justice and then exhibit a conception that fulfilled these
conditions. Eventually one may be able to do this. For the time being,
however, I do not see how to avoid rough and ready methods. (Rawls
[1971] 1999, 123)
There follows a discussion that would please experimental scientists regarding how
this inductive process “singles out certain features of the basic structure as desirable,”
and a note of realism regarding the limitations of experimental practice in the
assertion that “one cannot constructively characterize or enumerate all possible
conceptions of justice, or describe the parties so that they are bound to think of
them” (Rawls [1971] 1999, 123). That is, good scientific practice involves not overreaching, showing caution about one’s results, and allowing the evidence to generate
valuable information about the considerations involved in people’s thinking about
justice. Rawls, then, rejects the more traditional deductive philosophical approach
associated with defining “necessary and sufficient conditions for a uniquely best
conception of justice” as an appropriate method of investigation, and presents his two
principles as ones that would be discovered in a well-organized process of empirical
observation.
Thus it seems fair to say that the reason Rawls adopts his indirect way of
proceeding rather than argue directly for his conclusions is that he regards the
procedure he uses as essentially more objective. Rather than engage in philosophical
reasoning from his own perspective regarding the “necessary and sufficient conditions
for a uniquely best conception of justice,” and then have to attempt to “exhibit a
conception that fulfilled these conditions” as he himself would personally see it,
Rawls steps out of his role as philosopher, and allows what is “distinctly preferable to
others” (Rawls [1971] 1999, 125) — others moreover who the veil of ignorance
experimental controls makes into rational persons (§25) — to determine what the
principles of justice are.
Of course, it comes as no surprise to the reader that these “others” select the two
principles of justice which Rawls himself favors. Of course there are no “others” who
actually make a selection among the principles of justice, since they are only imagined
selectors, as Rawls’s experiment is entirely a thought experiment. At the same time, in
contrast to much of the long history of Gedanken experimenten,4 his thought
experiment is explicitly framed in modern laboratory terms as if it were being carried
out in controlled experimental conditions. In fact Rawls appears sufficiently familiar
with the problem of internal validity in laboratory experimentation that he explains
the original position in terms of controls and procedural requirements in his
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formulation of the veil of ignorance. Thus his original position idea innovates on the
traditional thinking of the original contract theorists by treating the state of nature as
if it were a carefully controlled laboratory, albeit an imagined one.
Ultimately, then, Rawls’s reason for producing his results regarding the two
principles of justice in this indirect manner, as opposed to direct philosophical
argument, is that he takes the model of the laboratory to legitimate his results —
results he apparently believes he cannot justify more directly as a single researcher.
But the irony of his mode of presentation is that we all know that his experimental
subjects are imaginary, and that there are difficult questions regarding his original
position construction associated with the internal validity of his “experiment.”
Indeed, readers of A Theory of Justice cannot help but feel that the experimental set-up
has been designed to weaken the attractiveness of positions Rawls opposes, as when
he lists his own two principles of justice first, and poses as alternative justice
principles ones he has long contested in the scholarly literature before the book’s
appearance. We might even speculate that since the book went through a lengthy
gestation process and adjustment to many commentators (cf. the Preface), it is likely
that Rawls’s multiple drafts of the book involved his continually revising the set-up for
the original position until he and others thought it gave as strong an argument as
possible for his two principles of justice. In effect, Rawls considered possible outputs
of previous runs of his “experiment,” was not pleased with their results, re-worked the
set-up, again examined the outputs, until, as a philosopher, he believed his arguments
were consistent and persuasive. What the book ultimately does if we strip away the
original position set-up, then, is what philosophers would expect it to do: make
deductive arguments from well-examined assumptions. Yet the book is nonetheless
rhetorically styled as an inductive procedure with independent experimental
participants who produce Rawls’s conclusions.
Many philosophers and other commentators have simply put aside Rawls’s
mode of presentation to concentrate directly on the relationship between the
theoretical foundations he adopts in the original position and his two principles of
justice. For example, some (e.g., Harsanyi 1975) have criticized Rawls’s assumption
that those selecting principles of justice from behind the veil would employ maximin
reasoning (Rawls [1971] 1999, 152ff), since that plays a significant role in justifying
the difference principle. The argument they make, however, is not that selectors
might use other principles of reasoning that overturn the difference principle, but
that it is not clear that we, reasoning philosophically about justice, should make
maximin reasoning foundational to our theory of justice. From this perspective,
Rawls’s attempt to make it seem that maximin reasoning supports the difference
principle, on the grounds that hypothetical experimental subjects in the original
position could be expected to think in this manner, only gets in the way for the critics
of asking whether individuals assumed to be free and equal (a characteristic of
individuals in the state of nature) should indeed be conceived to use such reasoning.
As a professional courtesy and measure of respect for Rawls, however, few say his
experimental procedure is but a sleight of hand.
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Suppose that economists nonetheless take seriously Rawls’s idea that
independent individuals might interact and select principles of justice. How might
they otherwise proceed in explaining the selection or choice process? In the next two
sections I suggest two changes to Rawls’s “experimental” framework. First, we need a
richer, more realistic conception of independent individuals as experimental subjects
than he employs in the original position, and second we need a more realistic
conception and modeling of the process of interaction between individuals than the
one he employs. To address the first point, the next section turns to Rawls’s often
overlooked Part III (Chapter VII, “Goodness as Rationality”) expanded discussion of
what individuals are and his associated “full theory of the good” (Rawls [1971] 1999,
396). To address the second point, the following section uses this alternative
conception of individuals and full theory of the good to model the justice principles
selection process as a complex adaptive system.
Rawlsian Individuals and the Full Theory of the Good
We saw that an important part of Rawls’s set-up involves placing “individuals” in his
original position. That they are behind a veil of ignorance, but at the same time are
able to choose principles of justice necessitates navigating a subtle balance between
providing individuals sufficient abilities that they can judge prospective principles of
justice and not providing them too much knowledge about how they would fare
under different principles of justice. Rawls’s strategy in Part I regarding how
individuals are to be understood is to simply require that individuals are rational
(Rawls 1971, §25). But by this he does not mean simply being capable of clear-headed
reasoning, as one typically assumes for experimental subjects in social science in
general. Rather, Rawls has a very specific sense of what is at play, since “the concept of
rationality must be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow sense, standard in
economic theory, of taking the most effective means to given ends” (Rawls [1971]
1999, 14). More fully:
The concept of rationality invoked here . . . is the standard one familiar in
social theory. Thus in the usual way, a rational person is thought to have a
coherent set of preferences between the options open to him. He ranks
these options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows
the plan which will satisfy more of his desires than less, and which has the
greater chance of being successfully executed. (Rawls [[1971] 1999, 143)
Indeed, a “feature of justice as fairness is to think of the parties in the initial situation
as rational and mutually disinterested,” where, if not strictly meaning they are egoistic,
this means “they are conceived as not taking an interest in one another’s interests”
(Rawls [1971] 1999, 13). Thus in the opening argument of the book Rawls is working
with at least a close analogue of the standard concept of a rational individual in
economics, and views the selection or choice process across individuals as resulting in
principles of justice by which individuals would order their lives together.
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Yet once his two principles of justice have been selected, and after his Part II
illustration of how those principles might function in modern constitutional
democracies, Rawls proceeds to “present in more detail the theory of the good which
has already been used to characterize primary goods and the interests of the persons in
the original position” ([1971] 1999, 395) en route to his “full theory of the good”
(396). Key to this full theory is an enlarged view of the individual built around the
idea that “a person’s good is determined by what is for him the most rational plan of
life given reasonably favorable circumstances” (395; also cf. §15). What we find here,
then, is not his earlier rational persons analogue to economics’ rational individuals,
but the development and application of the largely forgotten work of Josiah Royce
(esp. Royce 1908), but also many other early twentieth century American writers —
Ralph Barton Perry and John Dewey are emphasized (cf. Rawls [1971] 1999, 400n,
408n). Royce was influenced by Charles Peirce and William James, and as Rawls
relates, advanced the idea that a “rational plan for a person determines his good,” and
that “a person may be regarded as a human life lived according to a plan” (408). There
is much more that Rawls says about this life plan definition of the individual and also
about what makes a rational plan of life rational, but for what follows I emphasize his
following claim about a rational life plan’s “time structure” (410):
We must not imagine that a rational plan is a detailed blueprint for action
stretching over the whole course of a life. It consists of a hierarchy of plans,
the more specific subplans being filled in at the appropriate time. . . . The
structure of a plan not only reflects the lack of specific information but it
also mirrors a hierarchy of desires proceeding in similar fashion from the
more to the less general. . . . A rational plan must, for example, allow for
the primary goods, since otherwise no plan can succeed; but the particular
form that the corresponding desires will take is usually unknown in
advance and can wait for the occasion. (Rawls [1971] 1999, 410)
There then follow brief remarks on the subjects of scheduling and temporal sequence
and also on the general idea that conflicting desires need to be avoided in order to
maintain the person’s more permanent aims and interests.
This is all very interesting and an under-appreciated dimension of Rawls’s
thought, but my goal here is not to fully present Rawls’s enlarged view of the person,
but to rather point to the departures it makes from the standard economics
conception of rational individuals.5 Essentially there seem to be three differences: (1)
individuals understood to have rational life plans are heterogeneous because they
encounter life’s circumstances differently; (2) individuals do not have perfect foresight
and are essentially boundedly rational; and (3) individuals engage in a deliberative
kind of decision-making that involves weighing different sorts of considerations in
making choices. Thus what motivates individuals at one point in their lives may not
motivate them at another, and a life plan is not a “detailed blueprint for action
stretching over the whole course of a life.” Yet as being identified as “rational” life
plans, individuals still always try to do the “best” for themselves. This is accordingly
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where Rawls’s expanded theory of the good goes beyond his schematic primary goods
approach.
The underlying idea, moreover, is that people can always be seen as seeking to
improve their capacities and abilities — a notion which he terms “the Aristotelian
Principle”:
The Aristotelian Principle runs as follows: other things equal, human
beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained
abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or
the greater its complexity. . . . The intuitive idea here is that human beings
take more pleasure in doing something as they become more proficient at
it, and of two activities they do equally well, they prefer the one calling on
a larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle discriminations. (Rawls
[1971] 1999, 426)
Thus individuals undergo a kind of personal development over their lives, which is
guided by the fundamental principle of having a rational life plan, is affected by the
twists and turns along life’s various pathways, and varies from one individual to the
next. While this remains a very general set of ideas about what individuals are, the
point I want to make is that it more closely reflects thinking about individuals/agents
in complexity economics examinations of social interaction than in standard
economics’ atomistic rational individual conception. Individuals as described in
complex adaptive systems have a general motivation to do the “best” for themselves,
but what this involves both varies across individuals — they are heterogeneous — and is
affected by the pathways they follow in interaction with each other. Consider, then,
the modeling of individuals thus understood in terms of their social interactions, and
how this allows us to re-characterize the principles of justice selection process.
The Selection Process as Social Interaction in a Complex Adaptive System
How might we model a principles of justice selection process in terms of social
interaction in a complex adaptive system? Rawls models his original position selection
process as if it were a laboratory experiment, imagining that real individuals might
participate as experimental subjects. But there is considerable ambiguity surrounding
how this imaginary process might work itself out were Rawls not to pre-determine the
outcome. In contrast, modeling the selection process as a complex adaptive system
involves a more highly disciplined procedure. Complex systems are typically simulated
because their properties cannot be determined analytically. In this respect, they are
like Rawls’s imaginary original position experiment in that they call for an inductive
type of investigation. One has to run the simulation to discover what the properties of
the system are. But in contrast to Rawls’s method, using a complex system approach
first requires identifying some mathematical-logical model of the process being
investigated, which is then programmed for the simulation. There is really no
counterpart to this in Rawls’s investigation. Of course a variety of theoretical
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assumptions and arguments play a role in his representation of the original position,
but they lack the character of a model, at least as models are understood in
economics. A simulation approach, then, is like an experimental one, but is different
in being structured by its underlying mathematical-logical model.
Non-economists (and many economists too) often express skepticism regarding
the scientific value of mathematical models, arguing they are too detached from the
reality being modeled, and this might be thought to argue against simulating complex
systems as an alternative means of investigating Rawls’s selection process. Against this
is the fact that beginning in the 1930s and especially in the postwar period
mathematical modeling has been central to economic practice as specifically a method
of empirical observation (cf. Morgan 2003). That is, in contrast to theories,
mathematical models permit “numerical representation of the phenomena under
investigation,” which constitutes the means to their measurement, which is itself “a
kind of observation” (Boumans 2005, 2). Without measurement, the quantitative
dimensions of phenomena, particularly economic phenomena, are unobservable, and
empirical science cannot go forward. What critics typically overlook regarding the
modeling process is that economic reality is not there to be observed until it has been
represented quantitatively. Formal modeling (plus the attendant programming for
simulations), then, provides the foundations for empirical investigation of social
systems made up of interdependent individuals that are too complex to investigate in
more standard ways. Thus the argument for replacing Rawls’s method with a complex
systems approach is that the empirical investigation he wants to carry out necessitates
a more sophisticated scientific apparatus than his Gedanken experimenten offer.
What, then, is involved in modeling the selection process as a complex adaptive
system? That individuals are interdependent in complex adaptive systems means that
their behavior needs to be interpreted as a stochastic process that represents the
optimal behavior of each individual as conditional on the behavior of all others and
also on the aggregate properties of the system they occupy. Individuals who are
boundedly rational try to do the “best” they can for themselves, but what this
specifically amounts to cannot be fully determined apart from the pathways they
pursue, and these pathways themselves depend upon their interaction and the
character of the system in which they interact. Such systems are described as complex
and adaptive because feedback effects on individual behavior from interaction
between individuals constantly causes individuals to revise (and we might say,
“deliberate over”) what they regard as the best thing to do. These behavioral
adjustments in turn change the aggregate characteristics of the system, so that
complex adaptive systems exhibit phase transitions and emergent properties that then
further affect individual behavior. Complex systems may also be characterized by
network externalities and sensitivity to shocks and random factors, which can also
influence the sequencing of individual decision-making, and produce path
dependence for individual behavior and the system as a whole (cf. Durlauf 2005).
Suppose, then, that individuals are understood as in Rawls’s Chapter VII
account of rational persons rather than as in his Chapter III rational economic
individuals, and that the justice selection process is seen as working as a complex
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adaptive system rather than as in his original position scenario. That is, we abandon
Rawls’s artificial and narrowly constructed imaginary experiment described above, and
represent the principles of justice selection process as a process of social interaction
understood in terms of a sequence of decentralized, uncoordinated decisions made by
heterogeneous individuals, where the environment has a potential for network
externalities and unexpected shocks. How do individuals behave? Rawls’s Chapter VII
view of individuals, whose rational life plans consist of “a hierarchy of plans, the more
specific subplans being filled in at the appropriate time” (Rawls [1971] 1999, 410),
suggests that individuals operate with a changing collection of different strategies,
algorithms, or mental models, hierarchically arranged “from the more to the less
general” (410) which they draw upon and continually revise in order to address the
different types of circumstances they encounter. As some of these strategies are more
successful than others, individuals settle on smaller sets of strategies that tend to best
achieve their broad life plans (though this smaller collection of strategies is
presumably still always subject to revision). That is, they engage in a learning process
that generally improves their capacity to achieve broad plans of action that
progressively promote their capacities and abilities. These broad plans are emergent
upon this learning process, and again following Rawls they may be generally
understood according to his Aristotelian principle whereby “human beings take more
pleasure in doing something as they become more proficient at it” (426). So Rawls’s
broader conception of the person in terms of continually evolving life plans fits quite
well with the view of individuals interacting with one another in complex adaptive
systems.
Here I do not offer a particular model or simulation of such an approach, but
instead make a general claim regarding what this alternative set-up tells us about a
principles of justice selection process. Since complex adaptive systems are
characterized as exhibiting emergent properties, it follows that we cannot guarantee
that complex processes of social interaction between individuals will produce Rawls’s
two principles of justice unless we have a special reason to say that the learning process
in which individuals are engaged somehow enables them to sort through their
alternative strategies in such a way that they generally tend to settle on certain shared
principles of interaction — which we might then call principles of justice. That is,
something needs to ground the learning process in certain principles if Rawls’s view is
to go through. Here, then, we might note a set of suggestions specific to the nature of
social interaction which Rawls makes following his discussion of life plans regarding
what he believes lends “relative stability” to systems of justice. Thus in Chapter 75 he
goes on from his discussion of life plans to state that there are three psychological laws
which appear to underlie much human behavior: in families people return love, in
communities they reciprocate fellow feeling, and institutions seen to be just engender
a sense of just behavior.6 If these principles indeed hold, then it seems reasonable to
say his principles of justice could emerge from a complex interactive selection process.
That is to say, should our specification of the behavioral properties of individuals
modeled as interacting in complex systems make psychological characteristics such as
these a part of their make-up, then, depending on such things as the conditions under
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which they interact, Rawls’s principles could be selected. This, of course, makes
Rawls’s account more complicated and a complex systems interpretation of the
selection process is clearly a departure from his methodology, but it has the virtue of
showing a way of linking substantive normative views more tightly to his broader view
of the individual in terms of life plans and deep psychology. I draw three general
conclusions, therefore, from this alternative representation of a justice principles
“selection” process in order to comment on Rawls’s project.
First, Rawls’s innovation on the classic state of nature social contact idea in the
form of his original position thought experiment seems to undermine rather than
support philosophy’s traditional analytic form of investigation of justice principles.
Philosophy’s comparative advantage as a discipline, we might say, is to engage in
abstract reasoning regarding the most general categories of reality. Rawls, however,
repackages this reasoning as a historical experiment in a choice process, and invests
legitimacy in the conclusions reached only by virtue of this repackaging. In doing so
he arguably jeopardizes the meaningfulness of the traditional abstract reasoning
process, since a more realistic account of social choice processes, as I hope to have
suggested in the alternative proposal set forth here, tells us that what can be achieved
in this manner is more limited than Rawls believes. Indeed, much of the critical
review of A Theory of Justice by philosophers concentrates on the abstract argument
running from Rawls’s characterization of individuals to his principles of justice,
setting aside his misleading device of the original position and veil of ignorance.
Better, it might be said, to have left philosophy as philosophy, and not to have moved
onto the unstable terrain of economics’ rational individual social choice analysis,
unless one is prepared to think more systematically about the nature of social
interaction.
Second, we might register an important lesson from complexity theory regarding
aggregation procedures and social outcomes by noting that Rawls’s device of replacing
multiple individuals with a hypothetical representative individual in the justice
principles selection process (Rawls [1971] 1999, 96ff) closely resembles Arrow’s
“dictator” solution to the problem of social choice (Arrow [1951] 1963), though
without a recognition on Rawls’s part of it as an impossibility result. Arrow’s
impossibility problem was that one cannot aggregate over the choices of multiple
individuals (under reasonable assumptions) to produce a unique social choice
function except when one sets aside the aggregation exercise by substituting the
preferences of a single “dictator” for the preferences of all individuals (thus essentially
rendering the social choice idea meaningless). Arrow’s problem was subsequently
shown to be species of a more general difficulty associated with aggregating up to
social-level phenomena in individualist frameworks, for example, in connection with
discovery of the problematic character of general equilibrium theory where
aggregating up to system properties from properties ascribed to individuals — the socalled Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results. More generally, it is now clear that it is
often the case that claims made about either individuals or aggregates of individuals
cannot be readily extended to the other without very strong assumptions (Kirman
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2011, 84-86). Recognition of this entire issue and the nature of aggregation problems
is unfortunately missing from Rawls’s project as well as much of the commentary on
it.
Third, we might re-appraise Rawls’s results from the perspective of Part II of A
Theory of Justice, where as noted already, he addresses the fit, so to speak, of his two
principles selected in the first part of the book with the practices and history of
constitutional democracies in the postwar period. Suppose for the moment that
historical societies in the development of liberal market systems indeed work much
like complex adaptive systems, an argument which has famously been made in a
smaller space with respect to the technology adoption process in these societies (David
1985). Then we might argue that Rawls’s statement and argument for his two
principles of justice simply record in reflexive fashion a social outcome of the postwar
period as observed by one person, John Rawls. His particular representation of the
determination of these principles in terms of his Part I original position selection
process then functions as an adequate myth in the tradition of state of nature
arguments in Western liberal states, but his identification of his two principles of
justice rather constitutes one observation of the justice principles (among many) that
are in fact emergent in liberal market societies. On this view, Rawls’s principles of
justice (and also the rival principles of justice in play today) are social outcomes of
interaction between individuals in relatively decentralized modern social systems.
Thus Rawls’s desired results might be achieved in a more realistic manner by
historical argument, and the real strength of A Theory of Justice is then his Part II
demonstration that his principles are operative in successful constitutional
democracies, all on the assumption that the social-economic world works much as a
complex adaptive system.
Some Comments on the Normative in Economics
What my arguments in the previous sections were meant to do was to give a reading
of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice from the perspective of recent economics, given that
Rawls employs a method of argument that resembles new methodologies employed in
recent economics. Since Rawls is investigating a choice process, and investigating the
conditions under which choices get made has become increasingly central to recent
economics, it is interesting to re-examine Rawls’s from the point of view of the latter.
While this provides new perspectives on how principles of justice might emerge from
social interaction, there is a problem in proceeding this way when it comes to how we
think about the normative. Whereas Rawls’s book is explicitly a normative
investigation into how his principles of justice might be defended as fair, economics,
at least in mainstream theory, quite strongly separates descriptive and normative
judgments. Indeed, the characterization of social interaction in complex adaptive
systems as outlined in the last section also proceeds as if normative concerns are not
really involved, so that by recasting Rawls in this manner we are in a position of
having to say that should social interaction in complex systems generate Rawls’s types
of principles, then we might “call” them principles of justice. Is there a way, then, of
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arguing that an interactive process that reframes Rawls in this way actually produces
genuine principles of justice?
One way to answer this question consistent with complex adaptive systems
theory, which also uses Rawls’s richer life plans view of the individual with its
emphasis on individuals’ progressive improvement of their capacities and abilities, is
to make recourse to the concept of a convention. Systems of social interaction often
cause conventions to materialize, because they simplify decision-making. But
conventions per se are only normative in a weak sense in that they are essentially
pragmatic, and make no special reference to ethical values. It is interesting, then, that
there exist experimental grounds for arguing that conventions sometimes evolve into
social norms in a stronger normative sense. Francesco Guala (2010) recently did an
experiment in the form of a coordination game that ran for multiple rounds, thus in
some respects approximating a number of the features of a complex adaptive system
whereby individuals in interaction with one another would learn which strategies
worked best. He found that conventions about play emerged by the ninth round.
Then in a tenth round he allowed one of the players to be tempted to violate this
convention. The remaining players, however, continued to observe the convention,
and he argued that this suggests that “conventions acquire normative power” as more
than just pragmatic requirements (2010, 755). Why might we follow him in this
conclusion? Here Rawls’s life plan idea can be helpful, since we could say that
conventions get integrated into individuals’ life plans on account of their relative
stability, and since these life plans are built around individuals’ progressive realization
of the good as individuals see it for themselves, these conventions are thereby elevated
to social norms which individuals believe they ought to observe for moral reasons.
Thus reading Rawls in terms of a complex social process of social interaction, where
we replace his standard economics conception of rationality and the individual by his
broader views of Part III, has the effect of not just recasting his view but also that of
complex social systems by showing how they may come to exhibit normative
properties.
Note again, then, that part of Rawls’s thinking about individuals and their life
plans is that he believes they tend to observe the three psychological laws
distinguished above. Rawls associates these laws with the “relative stability” of systems
of justice, but it is important to be clear about the direction of causality. Rawls’s three
laws can be seen to be principles of fairness since whether in the family, community,
or society’s institutions, the idea is that what one side gives is reciprocated, where this
is seen as a matter of being fair. Thus it is not that relatively stable patterns of
interaction, or conventions in Guala’s experiment, evolve into social norms, but
rather than there are norms implicit in systems of social interaction that behaviorally
speaking are normative by virtue of the meaning of reciprocity. It is not, consequently,
that systems of social interaction have the normative as an emergent dimension, but
rather that the ways in which they are normative is emergent upon how people
interact. This is relevant to whether the principles of justice in a process seen as
complex and adaptive ought to be expected to turn out as Rawls believed. What he
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might better have argued would happen is not that necessarily his two principles
would be selected, but that principles would be selected that were stable and fair.
Summary Remarks
This paper takes another look at Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, drawing on recent
thinking in economics to re-appraise his method of investigation. Much of the early
excitement about the book was due to his innovative framing of the justice principles
selection process, but from the vantage point of recent economics this innovation is
neither very remarkable nor very well done. In the first place, Rawls’s imagined
experiment falls well short of experimental practice in economics and social science in
general, so much so that he more exposes his preferred principles of justice to
question than gives them the credibility that a more direct form of argument would
likely produce. Secondly, by making principles of justice the outcome of a social
process he invites us to ask how and whether social processes generate such principles.
Then, if we model social processes as complex and adaptive, we come up with quite
different views about social outcomes and justices principles, and moreover find
ourselves with many new problems regarding their status and the ways in which they
evolve as normative principles.
Consequently it could be argued that what is most interesting about A Theory of
Justice is not its arguments and the book itself, but rather the agenda it opens up for
the theory of justice. By Rawls’s lights, the developments in recent economics briefly
described here raise questions that are prior to and in some respects more
fundamental than his own investigation. How can we investigate characteristically
normative selection principle processes in social processes? How do social systems
generate and modify normative principles, especially ones that are over-arching and
systemic in nature? Recent work in economics seems to be increasingly moving in the
direction of these issues, but it remains to be seen whether it will take up Rawls’s deep
concerns, the nature of justice, and make them central to its development.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Citations from the text are to the original edition.
See Pogge (2007) for a comprehensive recent evaluation and review of Rawls’s justice thinking. Rawls
himself shifted his focus and method in his subsequent Political Liberalism ([1993] 1996).
See Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey (1987a, 1987b) who actually implement Rawls’s hypothetical
experiment in the laboratory, and find that his principles of justice are not confirmed.
The expression was coined by Ernst Mach ([1905] 1975).
Note also that Rawls’s life plan concept is an ideal one. As one reviewer pointed out, many people,
for example the working poor and those below the poverty line, live payday to payday (see Wilson
1987).
I thank a reviewer from this journal for this reference.
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